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Abstract
In mid-September 2008, prime money market mutual funds (MMMFs) began experiencing
run-like redemption requests sparked by one fund that had “broken the buck” because of
large exposure to Lehman Brothers commercial paper (CP). As a result, MMMFs, which are
significant investors in CP, became reluctant to hold CP. Within a week, outstanding CP had
been reduced by roughly $300 billion. The CP market experienced severe shortening of
maturities and increased rates, making it difficult for issuers to place new paper. When
government efforts to assist the MMMFs did not resolve the stresses in the CP market, the
Federal Reserve announced, on October 7, 2008, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(CPFF), which sought to backstop the CP market and revive term lending.
The CPFF (through a special purpose vehicle) purchased highly rated US dollar–
denominated three-month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from
eligible US issuers. Purchases were funded with loans from the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (FRBNY). The CPFF was highly utilized in its first weeks, purchasing the overwhelming
majority of new term CP; its usage then waned as market conditions improved. At its highest
level, in January 2009, the CPFF held $350 billion—20% of all outstanding CP. The CPFF
expired on February 1, 2010, with all loans paid in full. The program accumulated
approximately $5 billion in earnings that was paid to the FRBNY. The program is credited
with backstopping the market, providing a rollover option for maturing paper, and providing
much needed year-end financing. Its role in helping to revive the term-lending market,
however, has been debated, but there is evidence that it did help increase lending between
CPFF participants and their relationships with nonfinancial corporate borrowers.
Keywords: short-term funding, commercial paper, asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP),
mutual fund, money market mutual fund, liquidity facility, wholesale funding, Lehman
Brothers, Reserve Primary Fund
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This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs.
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Commercial Paper Funding Facility
At a Glance
Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on
September 15, 2008, a number of prime money
market mutual funds (MMMFs) began to
experience run-like redemption requests after one
fund with heavy exposure to Lehman’s commercial
paper (CP) “broke the buck,” announcing that it
could no longer maintain its $1 per share net asset
value (NAV). As a result, MMMFs, which are
significant investors in CP, retreated from CP.
Consequently, the CP market experienced severe
narrowing of terms and a corresponding increase
in rates, making it difficult for issuers to place new
paper, especially term paper. When government
efforts to assist the MMMFs did not resolve the
stresses in the CP market, the Federal Reserve
announced on October 7, 2008, the Commercial
Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).
Under the CPFF, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (FRBNY) made loans to a special purpose
vehicle—the CPFF LLC—which in turn purchased
highly rated, US dollar–denominated, three-month
unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper
(ABCP) from eligible US issuers (represented by
primary dealers). The FRBNY loans were funded
from its discount window, and interest was
charged at the target federal funds rate. The
maturities of each loan mirrored that of the CP
purchased. The LLC held the CP until maturity and
repaid the loans to the FRBNY with interest when
the CP matured.

Summary Evaluation

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To fund indirect purchases of highly rated threemonth unsecured and ABCP from eligible US issuers so as to
provide liquidity to the CP market and stimulate term
lending.
Announcement Date
October 7, 2008
Operational Date
October 27, 2008
Expiration Date
February 1, 2010
Dissolution of CPFF LLC
August 30, 2010
Legal Authority
Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act
Funding Source
FRBNY discount window
Interest Rate
Target federal funds rate
Peak Utilization
$738
billion
aggregate
purchases;
$350
billion
outstanding (January 2009); 82
issuers (total)
CP Eligible for Purchase
Three-month
USDdenominated unsecured and
ABCP rated at least A-1/P-1/F1
issued by eligible US issuers
Special Purpose Vehicle
CPFF LLC
Administrator
FRBNY
Participants
US Department of the Treasury
contributed $50 billion to
support the CPFF
Various expert firms were
hired to assist the LLC with
administration
and
investments.

During its first weeks of operation, CPFF LLC purchased the overwhelming majority of newly issued threemonth CP, and the launch of the program led to a significant jump in CP issuance. Assets of the LLC more
than doubled after one month and reached a peak of $350 billion in January 2009, when the CP it first
purchased matured and rolled over. After the early weeks, as market conditions improved, utilization of
the CPFF waned. The last of CPFF LLC’s holdings matured on April 26, 2010, and the LLC was dissolved
on August 30, 2010. All loans that were made to the LLC by the FRBNY were repaid in full in accordance
with their terms, and all of the CP that the LLC purchased was repaid in accordance with stated terms. The
FRBNY received $5 billion in earnings from the LLC as its sole member. The CPFF coexisted with other
government programs aimed at addressing the stress in the CP market, so it is difficult to fully assess its
impact. However, the program is credited with backstopping the market, providing a rollover option for
maturing paper, and assisting year-end financing. Its role in helping to revive the term-lending market,
however, has been debated, but there is evidence that it did help increase lending between CPFF
participants and their relationships with nonfinancial corporate borrowers (Li 2015).
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Commercial Paper Funding Facility: United States Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in
LCU converted to USD)

$14,681.5 billion in 2007
$14,559.5 billion in 2008
Source: Bloomberg

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in
LCU converted to USD)

$47,976 in 2007
$48,383 in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4, 2007:

Sovereign credit rating
(5-year senior debt)

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Size of banking system

Size of banking system
as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system
as a percentage of
financial system

5-bank concentration of
banking system

Foreign involvement in
banking system

Source: Bloomberg
$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
62.9% in 2007
68.3% in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of financial
system in 2007
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of financial
system in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
22% of total banking assets in 2007
18% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development
Database
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0% of banks owned by the state in 2008
Government ownership
of banking system
Existence of deposit
insurance

Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and
Supervision Survey
100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000 for
2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000 for
2008
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Overview

Background
On September 16, 2008, the day after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the $62 billion
Reserve Primary Fund, a money market mutual fund (MMMF) wrote down its $785 million
exposure to Lehman commercial paper (CP), which caused it to “break the buck,” and it
announced a net asset value (NAV) of less than $1 per share. Since investors tended to
believe their MMMF holdings were as good as cash (only one MMMF had ever broken the
buck before), the fund’s announcement prompted run-like redemption requests by many
MMMF investors, and in the following week, investors withdrew $117 billion from prime
MMMFs (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011).
As they scrambled for cash to meet redemptions and maintain their expected $1-per-share
NAVs, MMMFs, which in the aggregate are significant investors in CP, refused to roll over the
maturing CP they held or to purchase new CP. A month after Lehman’s bankruptcy,
outstanding CP had declined by $300 billion (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011).
Seventy percent of this decline was a flight from financial CP, which was CP issued by banks
and other financial institutions, which is traditionally unsecured. Seventy-five percent of the
remaining CP was being rolled over daily, in contrast to traditionally being issued with
maturities of 30 days or more (Anderson and Gascon 2009). After September 2008, this
contraction in maturities was coupled with sharply elevated rates, all but freezing the market
for term CP and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP).
Concerned that stresses on the MMMFs and seizing up of the CP market might have negative
effects on the financial system and possibly spill over to the broader economy, the
government took steps to counter the stresses, including an optional guarantee of MMMF
accounts against losses resulting from a fund breaking the buck3 and the indirect purchase
of high-quality ABCP from MMMFs that experienced investor runs.4 Although these actions
helped to protect the MMMFs, and forestall their selling assets at greatly depressed prices,
they did not fill the gap in demand for CP created by the exit of MMMFs, nor did CP rates
stabilize.
Program Description
On October 7, 2008, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) announced the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility (CPFF), which was intended to provide a liquidity backstop to the CP market
by funding the purchase of highly rated CP from issuers and “to improve liquidity in shortterm funding markets and thereby increase the availability of credit for businesses and
households” (Federal Reserve 2008a; Federal Reserve 2008c). The CPFF was established
pursuant to the Fed’s emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act
of 1913 (FRA)5 and was funded from the Fed’s discount window (FRBNY 2009).

_____________________________________________________________________
3 US Treasury Temporary Guarantee Programs for Money Market Funds. Also see McNamara (2016)

discussing
the guarantee program.
4 See Wiggins (forthcoming) discussing the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility (AMLF).
5 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Section 13(3) (12 U.S.C. § 343)—“Discount of Obligations Arising out of Actual
Commercial Transactions, as Amended.”
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A designer of CPFF comments that it was regarded by many Fed staffers as the program that
most pushed the envelope of what was legal under FRA Section 13(3). This was because the
Fed was effectively lending on a mostly unsecured basis and relying on accumulated upfront
fees to cover potential losses. At the time, this structure was intensely debated.
Under the CPFF, the Fed purchased highly rated, US dollar–denominated, three-month
unsecured CP and ABCP from a wide range of eligible financial and nonfinancial US issuers
(FRBNY 2009). The purchases were made indirectly through a newly established special
purpose vehicle, CPFF LLC, which was administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (FRBNY), the LLC’s managing, and only, member (Adiran, Kimbrough, and Marchioni
2011).
As shown in Figure 1, under the CPFF, the FRBNY loaned funds to the LLC, which then
purchased and held eligible CP from the primary dealers that represented eligible issuers.
The FRBNY loans were secured by all of the assets of the LLC, including the CP purchased,
assets purchased with the accumulated upfront fees paid by the issuers, any uninvested fees,
and any earnings. The rate charged to the LLC on loans from the FRBNY was the same as the
targeted federal funds rate charged to depository institutions that borrowed from the Fed’s
discount window, and the term of each loan mirrored the three-month term of the CP
purchased. When the CP matured, the LLC repaid the loan to the FRBNY with interest. All
assets and liabilities of the LLC were consolidated onto the balance sheet of the FRBNY.
Figure 1: Issuance to the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)

Note: Solid Lines represent steps in the transaction; dashed lines represent some of the control.
Source: Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011.
Eligible Issuers
Issuers eligible to sell CP to the CPFF were US issuers of CP, including US issuers with a
foreign parent company (FRBNY 2009). Each legal entity that issues CP was considered a
separate issuer under the CPFF.
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An issuer with an eligible foreign parent, however, could not sell to the LLC any CP issued by
other parts of the organization. In addition, in determining its Maximum Face Value6 (which
was the maximum amount of CP that a participating issuer could have outstanding on any
day) such issuer would not include any commercial paper issued by other parts of the
organization (FRBNY 2009).
Issuers who wished to access the CPFF were required to register with the Fed at least two
business days in advance of their intended use of the CPFF by submitting the completed
Issuer Registration Documents and paying the facility registration fee of 10 basis points
(0.1%) on their Maximum Face Value (FRBNY 2009).
CPFF Purchased
The CPFF purchased only three-month, US dollar–denominated unsecured CP and ABCP that
was rated at least A-1/P-1/F1 by a nationally recognized statistical rating organization
(NRSRO) (FRBNY 2009). If rated by multiple NRSROs, the CP had to be rated at least A-1/P1/F1 by two or more NRSROs.
As was the market custom, the LLC purchased CP at a discount from face value (FRBNY
2009). The applicable discount was based on a rate equal to a spread over the three-month
overnight index swap (OIS) rate on the day of purchase. The spread for unsecured CP was
100 basis points per annum, and the spread for ABCP was 300 basis points per annum. For
unsecured CP, an additional 100 basis points per annum was imposed as a credit
enhancement fee, to be paid on each trade execution date. This fee was to compensate the
Fed for the higher risk involved with respect to unsecured CP and to ensure that the lending
was “indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank,” a
requirement of Section 13(3) of the FRA. An issuer of unsecured CP that participated in the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(TLGP),7 which was implemented on October 14, 2008, could avoid the credit enhancement
fee for issues covered by the TLGP, which was accepted by the CPFF as a satisfactory
guarantee (FRBNY 2009). The CPFF provided same-day settlement, operating as an
immediate source of funds.
Use of Third Parties
The FRBNY relied on a combination of existing and new infrastructure to implement the
CPFF and sought the input of market participants when deciding on the terms and
operational details of the CPFF (Federal Reserve 2008c). For example, the FRBNY required
each CP issuer to utilize a primary dealer as an issuing agent, even if the issuer usually placed
its CP directly. In this way, the Fed relied on the primary dealers’ market knowledge and
_____________________________________________________________________
The Maximum Face Value was calculated as the greatest amount of US dollar–denominated A-1/P-1/F1 CP
that the issuer had outstanding on any day between January 1 and August 31, 2008 (Registration Instructions).
The Registration Instructions also provided that, “[i]f the Issuer has more than one commercial paper program,
[the Maximum Face Value] should be the aggregate amount outstanding under all programs on a single day and
all of the Issuer’s programs should be listed below … The Issuer agrees that while participating in this Facility,
it will not sell commercial paper to the CPFF such that the total amount of commercial paper outstanding
(including commercial paper held by the CPFF and other investors) would exceed the Maximum Face Value.”
7 On October 14, 2008, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) implemented the Temporary
Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) consisting of two components: (1) the Transaction Account Guarantee
Program (TAGP), an FDIC guarantee in full of noninterest-bearing transaction accounts; and (2) the Debt
Guarantee Program (DGP), an FDIC guarantee of certain newly issued senior unsecured debt (FDIC, n.d.).
6

180

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 2 Iss. 3

their verification of potential issuers’ creditworthiness based on established market criteria
(Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011).
In similar fashion, the FRBNY hired Pacific Investment Management Company, LLC (PIMCO)
to advise it in setting up the CPFF infrastructure and to provide transaction agent and
investment management services (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). It hired State
Street Bank and Trust (State Street) to hold custody of the LLC’s assets and perform its
administrative functions. (The LLC had no employees. State Street, in essence, operated on
its behalf.) The Depository Trust Company, which traditionally cleared CP transactions for
the primary dealers and State Street, among others, also provided these services for the
CPFF.
The consultation with and use of experts enabled the Fed to begin issuer preregistration for
the CPFF on October 20, 2008, and to make the first purchases of CP pursuant to the CPFF
on October 27, 2008, just 20 days after the facility’s announcement (Adrian, Kimbrough, and
Marchioni 2011).
Outcomes
Usage of the CPFF was aggressive, and rates on CP in the market fell precipitously as soon as
the program was announced. On the first day of operation, the CPFF purchased more than
$50 billion of CP; in its first week, $144 billion. During the next few weeks, it purchased the
overwhelming majority of newly issued three-month CP. Assets of the CPFF more than
doubled after one month, reaching $293 billion by the end of November 2008, and reached
$333 billion by the end of December 2008. The CPFF reached its peak of $350 billion—the
maximum amount outstanding at any one time—during the third week of January 2009,
when the CP first purchased by the CPFF matured and was rolled over. At this time, the LLC
owned 20% of all outstanding CP (Anderson and Gascon 2009).
Figure 2 illustrates the CPFF’s share of new issues and outstanding CP during its tenure.
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Figure 2: CPFF Share of Purchases and Outstanding Commercial Paper

Source: FRB, H.4.1 Table; Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Anderson and Gascon 2009).
In total, the CPFF purchased an aggregate of $738 billion in CP, including $342 billion of ABCP
(Li 2015). Eighty-two issuers participated in the CPFF; however, when aggregated at the
sponsor level, it is evident that usage was somewhat concentrated as the top 10 issuers
accounted for approximately $474 billion, or more than half of the program total.
Approximately 10% of the purchased CP was from nonfinancial corporations or their finance
affiliates, such as General Electric Company, Ford Motor Company, General Motors
Corporation, and BMW (Li 2015; van Deventer 2011).
Figure 3 shows the patterns of usage of the CPFF by the 10 largest sponsors. Included are a
number of large financial institutions and nonfinancial institutions that were known to be
having difficulties at the time, such as American International Group, Dexia SA, Fortis SA/NV,
and Citigroup (van Deventer 2011). Notably, this grouping included a number of US
subsidiaries of foreign banks, with UBS-related issuers having the most CP purchased by the
program. In aggregate, banks with European parents accounted for nearly 60% of the
utilization of the CPFF. This became a point of controversy when disclosed by the Fed in
2011.
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Figure 3: Ten Largest Sponsors That Utilized the Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(CPFF)
Parent/Sponsor Name Amount
(millions)

Frequency CP
Type

Discount Credit
Rate
Enhancement
(%)
(%)

UBS
American
International Group
Dexia SA

74,531.102
60,230.602

11
90

CP
CP

1.452
1.908

1.000
0.711

53,476.301

42

CP

1.370

1.000

Hudson Castle

53,343.199

48

ABCP 3.320

0.000

BSN Holdings

42,794.000

57

ABCP 3.326

0.000

The
Liberty 41,379.801
Hampshire Company
Barclays PLC
38,774.898

36

ABCP 3.365

0.000

7

CP

1.320

1.000

Royal
Bank
of 38,517.000
Scotland Group
Fortis Bank SA/NV
38,483.699

67

ABCP 2.975

0.164

69

ABCP 3.173

0.072

Citigroup

10

ABCP 2.711

0.000

32,735.000

Total
474,265.602 437
Note: This table illustrates the 10 largest sponsors by total amount that used the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility during the period of October 27, 2008, to February 1, 2010. The names are
shown at t h e sponsor level instead of issuer level. This information is collected from the
Federal Reserve Board. The “Amount (millions)” column indicates the total amount of
CP/ABCP purchased by the Federal Reserve. The “Frequency” column shows the total numbers
of transactions. The “Discount Rate” column denotes the lending fee for accessing the CPFF,
which was equal to a three-month OIS rate plus 100 basis points per annum for unsecured
commercial paper. The discount rate imposed for asset-backed commercial paper was a threemonth OIS plus 300 basis points. The “Credit Enhancement” column indicates the surcharge
of a 100 basis point per annum fee paid up front on each sale of commercial paper to the
CPFF LLC in the cases without any collateral.
Source: Li 2015.
As market conditions improved, utilization of the CPFF waned. By December 2009, the
facility held only $10 billion of assets, and by April 2010, the balance fell to zero. The
aggregate lent under the facility during its tenure was $738 billion. In terms of dollars
expended, it was the third-largest program implemented by the Fed to combat the financial
crisis. Only the Term Auction Facility (TAF)8 and the US dollar swaps with foreign central
banks9 were larger.
The CPFF expired on February 1, 2010. All loans that were made to the LLC by the FRBNY
were repaid in full in accordance with the terms of the facility, and all the CP that the LLC
_____________________________________________________________________
8
9

See Wiggins and Metrick 2016a for a discussion of the Term Auction Facility (TAF).
See Wiggins and Metrick 2016b for a discussion of the US dollar swaps with foreign central banks.
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purchased was repaid in accordance with stated terms. The last of the LLC’s holdings
matured on April 26, 2010, and it was dissolved on August 30, 2010. The LLC accumulated
nearly $5 billion in earnings, primarily from interest income, credit enhancement fees, and
registration fees, which was paid to the FRBNY as managing member.

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The CPFF was established under the Federal Reserve’s emergency powers under
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
In establishing the CPFF, the Fed relied on its authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act, which permits the Federal Reserve Board (the Board), in unusual and exigent
circumstances, to authorize Reserve Banks to extend credit to individuals, partnerships, and
corporations that are unable to obtain adequate credit accommodations. Federal Reserve
counsel cited a litany of events10 in its memorandum analyzing the deteriorating market
conditions and found that they were directly affecting the broader economy “[b]y restricting
the availability of credit” and “disrupt[ing] the commercial paper market and other forms of
financing for a wide range of firms.” (Alvarez et al. 2009). Counsel then concluded that there
was manifest evidence that “unusual and exigent circumstances” existed sufficient to
support the Board’s authorization of the CPFF under Section 13(3) of the FRA and also
“sufficient evidence to support a judgment that adequate credit accommodations for eligible
issuers of term CP are not available from other banking institutions” (Alvarez et al. 2009).
The CPFF represented a shift in the Fed’s policy approach to the crisis because it was a direct
effort to backstop a particular credit market that was failing. Further, through the CPFF, the
Fed in effect extended its discount window lending well beyond the entities to which it
traditionally lent—depository institutions and primary dealers—to provide liquidity to a
wide variety of financial and nonfinancial entities of varying sizes. Given the limited tools
available to the Fed, the CPFF in essence enabled it to utilize its pool of funds in a new way
to combat the deepening crisis.
A designer of CPFF comments that it was regarded by many Fed staffers as the program that
most pushed the envelope of what was legal under FRA Section 13(3). This was because the
Fed was effectively lending on a mostly unsecured basis and relying on accumulated upfront
fees to cover potential losses. At the time, this structure was intensely debated.
2. The FRBNY determined that the CPFF loans were “indorsed or otherwise secured
to [its] satisfaction” as required by Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
The wording of FRA Section 13(3) is broad and permits a Federal Reserve Bank discretion
to determine whether it is “secured to [its] satisfaction” in acting under the section. CPFF
design elements—having issuers preregister and be vetted, requiring use of a primary
dealer, upfront registration fees, credit quality, pricing, and maximum issuance amount—
were structured with the intent to protect the Fed from associated risks. Moreover, the legal
staffs of the Board and the FRBNY were involved in providing advice regarding the
_____________________________________________________________________
Developments cited included: (1) that for the past year, “the CP market has been under considerable strain
as money market mutual funds (MMMFs) and other investors have become increasingly reluctant to purchase
CP”; (2) that financial systems in the US and abroad were under “extraordinary stress, particularly the credit
and money markets”; and (3) that banks were “constrained in their ability to lend” and others were reluctant
to lend to them (Alvarez et al. 2009).
10
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design and implementation of the CPFF and concluded that the FRBNY could reasonably
determine that its loans to the LLC would be adequately secured on several levels:
•

Under the CPFF, the FRBNY’s loans to the LLC would be secured by all of the assets of
the LLC, including the CP purchased, assets purchased with the accumulated upfront
fees paid by the issuers, any uninvested fees, and any earnings. In addition, the CP
eligible for purchase under the facility would be highly rated, and purchases would
be subject to a discount from face value. Based on the sum of these facts, counsel
concluded that the FRBNY could reasonably conclude that all loans to the LLC would
be “secured to [its] satisfaction” with respect to all loans to the LLC.
Counsel further determined that if individual purchases of ABCP were considered, the
FRBNY could reasonably reach a similar conclusion because the ABCP was
collateralized by the pools of assets underlying the ABCP, even though these pools
might dip below the face value of the ABCP. Moreover, the risk of a drop in value was
somewhat mitigated by the discount applied at purchase.

•

With respect to individual purchases of unsecured CP, counsel found that the credit
premium fee of 100 basis points charged acted as an insurance premium (Alvarez et
al. 2009). This fee, together with the facility registration fee of 10 basis points on the
Maximum Face Value charged to each issuer, provided a pool11 to compensate the
FRBNY for any losses resulting from the CP.

3. The FRBNY outsourced certain key CPFF administrative functions.
The Fed had to build new legal, trading, investment, custodial, and administrative
infrastructure for CPFF operations as well as establish essential financial and operational
risk controls. Time was of the essence, so the Fed accessed market expertise and operational
efficiencies through contracted third parties that regularly participated in the CP market:
•

PIMCO advised the FRBNY in setting up the CPFF infrastructure and provided
transaction agent and investment management services.

•

State Street provided administrative and custodial services (in essence, it held the LLC
in custody and performed all its administrative functions). The LLC had no
employees.

•

Primary dealers acted as agents verifying issuers’ eligibility. Since they had
established relationships with the FRBNY and actively underwrote, placed, and made
a market in CP, they were well suited to intermediate between the CP issuers and the

_____________________________________________________________________
11 The transcript from a Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting that occurred a week after the CPFF
began preregistration reflects that, “[a]t the close of business last week [the first week of CPFF operations], 79
issuers had registered to use the facility, paying 10 basis points, or $580 million, to cover the potential issuance
of commercial paper. The 10 basis point fee provides a little equity to get the program off and running” (FOMC
2008b). The CPFF also accepted participation in the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program in lieu of
the credit enhancement fee.
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Fed. Issuers were required to sell through a primary dealer even if the issuer normally
issued its CP directly without use of an agent (Registration Instructions).
•

Depository Trust Company, which traditionally cleared CP transactions for the
primary dealers, CP issuing and payment agents (hired by issuers), and State Street,
provided these services for the CPFF. This permitted the CPFF to purchase CP through
the market’s standard clearing institution and provided same-day settlement, which
made it a viable option for issuers facing unexpected liquidity needs (Registration
Instructions).

Combining existing and new infrastructure and incorporating market expertise in this
manner permitted the Fed to: (1) analyze a number of options in designing the facility, such
as fees and managing credit risk, hypothetical losses, and moral hazard; and (2) design a
structure that was consistent with market standards and easily accessible to a wide number
of potential issuers (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). Use of experts also helped
make the CPFF operational by October 27, 2008, just 20 days after its announcement.
4. The CPFF was limited to “legacy issuers,” those that had issued CP before the
adoption of the CPFF.
The CPFF was intended to address the gap in funding caused by recent market disruptions,
not to be an additional liquidity channel. Thus, the CPFF was originally available only to
“legacy issuers,” any company that had issued CP before its inception, including those with a
foreign parent. In January 2009, the Fed further clarified this eligibility criterion with respect
to ABCP issuers. Such an issuer was deemed to have been inactive (and thus not eligible to
participate in the CPFF) if the issuer had not issued ABCP to institutions other than the
sponsoring institution for any period of three consecutive months or longer between January
1 and August 31, 2008 (FRBNY, CPFF: FAQs Jan. 23, 2009). This modification reinforced the
original intent of the facility and sought to limit moral hazard by excluding issuances that “no
longer had a natural investor base,” and mitigated the risk of funding issuers that the market
had withdrawn from for reasons unrelated to the crisis (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni
2011).
5. There were no restrictions on the type of entity that could borrow under the CPFF,
subject to being a US entity and “legacy issuer.”
In implementing the CPFF, the Fed decided that because of the broad nature of the CP market,
to be an effective backstop the CPFF had to be accessible to a “large cross-section of the
commercial-paper market while minimizing credit risk to the Reserve Bank” (Adrian,
Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011). CP issuers were a varied group of financial and
nonfinancial entities. Issuers eligible to utilize the CPFF had to be US entities, and included
US subsidiaries of foreign companies. However, any type of US company meeting the
definition of “legacy issuer” could utilize the CPFF. A narrower facility—for example, one
limited to financial entities—might not have addressed the issue of spillover to the real
economy.
Because the group of potential issuers was much broader than the limited types of firms the
Fed usually dealt with (depository institutions and primary dealers), it relied on its primary
dealers, which had CP market expertise and knowledge of issuers, as intermediaries. The
terms of the CPFF required issuers to sell through one or more primary dealer(s), even if the
issuer normally issued its CP directly. In this way, there was one additional check on
potential issuers’ creditworthiness.
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6. US subsidiaries of foreign companies were permitted to borrow under the CPFF.
US subsidiaries of foreign companies were eligible to borrow under the CPFF as long as they
otherwise met the definition of “legacy issuer.” An analysis of the CPFF transaction data
shows that, on average, European banks had borrowings of $145.5 billion, 57.3% of the
average outstanding borrowings under the CPFF. A number of banks that were experiencing
well-reported difficulties were among the list of top borrowers, including UBS, Dexia SA,
Royal Bank of Scotland, and Fortis SA/NV (van Deventer 2011).
7. The amount of CP that could be purchased from any one issuer was limited.
The maximum amount of a single issuer’s commercial paper that CPFF LLC could own at any
time was “the greatest amount of US dollar-denominated A-1/P-1/F1 commercial paper the
issuer had outstanding on any day between January 1 and August 31, 2008.” This amount
was called the “Maximum Face Value.” If an issuer had more than one CP program, the
Maximum Face Value would be the aggregate amount outstanding under all programs on a
single day. In addition, by executing the CPFF Issuer Registration Form and Qualification
Certification, the issuer agreed that while participating in the CPFF, it would not sell CP to
the CPFF such that the total amount of CP outstanding (including CP held by the CPFF and
other investors) would exceed the Maximum Face Value. These limitations helped to
maximize availability of the CPFF.
8. Fees and lending rates were structured to maximize availability while
discouraging arbitrage and moral hazard.
Similar to a bank loan commitment fee, a facility registration fee of 10 basis points (0.1%)
times the issuer’s Maximum Face Value was required for issuers seeking to utilize the CPFF.
The fee was payable upon registration and nonrefundable, even if the issuer never issued CP
under the CPFF. General Electric, whose GE Capital unit was the largest US issuer of CP in
October 2008 (and traditionally a direct issuer), registered and announced plans to use the
program that it called “good for the market and very important for the buyers of GE paper as
it provide[d] a secondary market” (Layne 2008).
As was the market custom, the CP was purchased at a discount from face value. The CP
purchased by the LLC was discounted based on a rate equal to a spread over the three-month
OIS rate on the day of purchase. As shown in Figure 4, the spread for unsecured commercial
paper was 100 basis points per annum and the spread for ABCP was 300 basis points per
annum.
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Figure 4: Applicable Rates and Fees under the CPFF
Type of Fee

Type of CP
Unsecured

ABCP

Lending Rate
(Discount/Haircut)

3-month overnight index swap
rate (OIS) + 100 bps

3-month overnight index swap
rate (OIS) + 300 bps

Unsecured Credit
Surcharge

100 bps on settlement

None

Total

3-month OIS + 200 bps

3-month OIS + 300 bps

Registration Fee

10 bps x Maximum Face Value

10 bps x Maximum Face Value

Source: FRBNY CPFF: Program Terms and Conditions, Effective October 14, 2008.
For unsecured CP, a credit enhancement fee of 100 basis points was charged on settlement.
This was to compensate the Fed for the higher risk involved and to ensure that the Fed was
“secured to [its] satisfaction” with respect to the unsecured CP, a requirement of FRA Section
13(3). However, this fee could be waived if the issuer participated in the FDIC’s TLGP (FRBNY
2009).
Fees under the CPFF were originally lower than market rates but were designed to be
unattractive when the market recovered, creating a disincentive for issuers to continue to
utilize the CPFF. As was expected, as the market recovered, usage of the CPFF declined. In
extending the CPFF to February 1, 2010, the Federal Reserve explained “[i]nterest rates
posted on the CPFF are at levels that are increasingly unattractive for many borrowers as
market conditions improve, and accordingly usage of the CPFF is declining fairly steadily”
(Federal Reserve 2009b).
9. CPFF accepted only highly rated US dollar–denominated, three-month CP and
ABCP for purchase.
CP eligible for purchase by the CPFF was only that rated A-1/P-1/F1, unsecured or assetbacked. Consistent with Rule 2a-7 (which provides restrictions governing MMMFs), per fund
conventions, a split rating was acceptable if two ratings were top-tier. In the time between
Lehman’s bankruptcy and the CPFF starting operations, outstanding CP dropped by $300
billion, and 70% of this decline was due to financial CP (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni
2011; Anderson and Gascon 2009). ABCP, which was widely used to finance consumer and
commercial assets and which had experienced substantial contraction during 2007,
experienced a much smaller drop, but maintaining this type of consumer and small business
funding was perceived as key to containing the crisis. Since highly rated CP constituted
nearly 90% of the market at the time, limiting the eligible CP to these criteria still enabled
the Fed to backstop almost the entire market while also shielding the Fed from CP with
greater credit risk (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011).
10. Purchases under the CPFF were limited to three-month CP.
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When the CPFF was enacted, 75% of newly issued CP had a maturity of one to four days.
Because the CPFF was designed to offer funding beyond what was already available in the
market, its focus became term lending. Traditionally, CP has been more liquid at one- and
three-month maturities, and since there were funding concerns for the approaching year
end, the Fed decided that the CPFF would purchase only three-month CP. Further, providing
term funding also helped to mitigate rollover risk. Issuers could place CP for longer periods
than the short maturities that the market was then accepting, and the Fed believed that this
would provide additional stability to the market because issuers did not have to immediately
look to refinance such amounts (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011).
11. The Federal Reserve utilized a special purpose vehicle, CPFF LLC, to purchase CP
under the CPFF rather than purchase and hold it directly.
The FRBNY administered the CPFF and provided three-month loans to the LLC. The LLC
would then use the funds to purchase eligible commercial paper from eligible issuers
through a primary dealer as issuing agent. The FRBNY’s loans were secured by the LLC’s
assets, including the CP that it purchased, fees that it collected and any uninvested fees, and
earnings and proceeds from investments. This structure was chosen because the Fed would
be dealing in a security that it did not normally handle and with many types of entities that
it did not normally lend to. (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011).
12. The CPFF was funded through loans from the FRBNY discount window.
Each week, the FRBNY loaned funds to CPFF LLC through the custodian, which would then
transfer the funds to the LLC. The LLC would then purchase the CP, which operated as
security for the loans, from the primary dealers (acting as the issuers’ issuing and payment
agents). When the CP matured, the issuer paid the LLC the principal plus interest. CPFF LLC
then repaid the FRBNY the principal of its loan and interest at the federal funds target rate
on the original loan date. The US Treasury also made a special deposit of $50 billion to the
FRBNY in support of the CPFF (Federal Reserve 2009a; FOMC 2008a).

III. Evaluation
GE Capital registered for the CPFF on October 23 and first accessed the facility on October
27, 2008. It commented favorably on the facility in a statement to its investors made on
November 12, 2008:
While we have continued to issue our commercial paper without disruption, we
believe this facility has added an important liquidity backstop to the $1.6 trillion
commercial paper (CP) market, helping to reduce rollover risk for participating
issuers and providing support for a more active secondary market. The CPFF has
strengthened confidence in the prime commercial paper market and has resulted in
more term buying, thus extending our average maturity range. We are eligible to
access the CPFF for up to $98 billion.
This facility in addition to the recently announced Money Market Investor Funding
Facility will provide significant support for the CP market. We are seeing maturities
extending and improved pricing in the market as a result of this program. (GEC 2008)
In testifying before the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services on
November 18, 2008, then–Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke also cited the impact of
the CPFF as favorable: “[It has] allow[ed] many firms to extend significant amounts of
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funding into next year,” resulting in “greater stability in money market mutual funds and the
commercial paper market” (Bernanke 2008).
A report that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) received at its January 2009
meeting described the impact of the CPFF and other Fed liquidity measures directed at the
CP market:
Conditions in the commercial paper (CP) market improved over the intermeeting
period, likely reflecting recent measures taken in support of this market, greater
demand from institutional investors, and the passing of year-end. Yields and spreads
on 30-day A1/P1 nonfinancial and financial CP as well as on asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCP) declined modestly and remained low. Yields and spreads on 30-day
A2/P2 CP, which is not eligible for purchase under the CPFF, dropped sharply after
the beginning of the year as some institutional investors reportedly reentered the
market. The dollar amounts of outstanding unsecured financial and nonfinancial CP
and ABCP rose slightly, on net, over the intermeeting period. This small change was
more than accounted for by the increase in CP held by the CPFF. In contrast, credit
extended under the AMLF declined over the intermeeting period. (FOMC 2009)
As noted above, the CPFF coexisted with other government programs aimed at addressing
the stress impacting the CP market, so it is difficult to assess its independent impact. In
explaining the high usage of the CPFF, however, Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni (2011)
point to two factors: (1) its directness and (2) its scope:
First, the CPFF addressed problems in short-term debt markets at their root—
through direct lending to issuers—at a time when issuers faced potential liquidity
shortfalls as a result of market dislocations. Indeed, the main factor distinguishing the
CPFF from the other two facilities [the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility and the Money Market Investor Funding
Facility (MMIFF)] is the CPFF’s role as a backstop to issuers, whereas the other
facilities [indirectly] provide emergency lending to institutional money market
investors. Second, the CPFF backstopped issuance of both unsecured and secured
commercial paper, while the AMLF funded only ABCP and the MMIFF special-purpose
vehicles purchased only certificates of deposit, bank notes, and commercial paper
from specific financial institutions. (Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni 2011)
Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni also conclude that usage of the CPFF was accompanied
by a narrowing of the spread between CP rates and comparable OIS rates.
Anderson and Gascon (2009) credits the CPFF with successfully backstopping the CP market,
providing a rollover option for maturing paper, and assisting year-end financing. However,
the authors that its role in helping to revive the term lending market is less certain, although
it was a substantial purchaser in its early weeks. Additionally, they find that some CP issuers
that participated in CPFF turned to the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program of the FDIC,
which guaranteed bank debt at far longer maturities.
In a more recent paper, Li (2015) explores the impact of the CPFF on those banks that used
it and concludes that it generated several favorable effects. Banks that participated in the
CPFF experienced reduced rollover risks and significant positive abnormal stock returns
during the tenure of the CPFF. Second, banks that used the CPFF also increased the quantity
of the loans that they made and decreased the yield on loans for firms with which they had
strong past relationships. Thus, Li concludes, the CPFF generated strong positive spillover
effects from the financial institutions that utilized it to those financial and nonfinancial
entities with which they had preexisting relationships, increasing the supply of liquidity.
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Terms_and_Condition
s_Feb09.pdf.
FRBNY CPFF: Program Terms and Conditions: Effective June 25, 2009 – extends the facility’s
tenure
and
modifies
certain
terms.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Terms_and_Condition
s_June09.pdf.
FRBNY CPFF: Frequently Asked Questions: Effective October 19, 2009 – FRBNY documents
providing FAQs and corresponding responses concerning operational issues and key features of
the
CPFF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Commercial%20Paper%20
Funding%20Facility%20Frequently%20Asked%20Questions.pdf.
FRBNY CPFF: Frequently Asked Questions: Effective January 23, 2009 – Early FAQ document
articulating
details
of
the
CPFF
program.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_FAQ_Jan09.pdf.
FRBNY CPFF: Frequently Asked Questions: Effective February 3, 2009 – FAQ document from
the FRBNY answering questions that arose between January 23, 2009 and February 3, 2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_FAQ_Feb09.pdf.
FRBNY CPFF: Frequently Asked Questions: Effective June 25, 2009 – Final FAQ document on
the
CPFF
issued
by
the
FRBNY.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_FAQ_June09.pdf.
Implementation Documents
Registration Instructions – FRBNY instructions and documents to be completed by issuers
seeking to qualify to utilize the CPFF, consisting of (1) the Issuer Registration Form, (2)
Qualification Certification, and (3) Eligible Program information Form and Certification of
FDIC
Debt
Guarantee.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/RegistrationInstructions.pdf
.
Issuer Registration Form and Qualification Certification – document pursuant to which an
issuer provided information necessary to determine its qualification, size of its Maximum Face
Value, designated type of CP to be issued and issuing dealer, calculated and paid
facility/registration
fee,
and
agreed-to
program
terms.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/RegistrationInstructions.pdf
.
Eligible Program Information Form – used by the issuer to list its CP programs that were
eligible
to
participate
in
the
CPFF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/RegistrationInstructions.pdf
.
Certification of FDIC Debt Guarantee – used by the issuer to certify that it was a participant in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
(TLGP), that the CP that it sells to the CPFF will be FDIC-guaranteed under the TLGP, and
certain
other
related
agreements.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/RegistrationInstructions.pdf
.
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Investment Management Agreement (October 20, 2008) and Amendment (April 7, 2010) –
agreement between CPFF LLC and PIMCO pursuant to which PIMCO provided investment
management services in regards to the CPFF, and amendment which adjust fees and provides
for
a
more
limited
volume
of
services
through
June
2010.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_IMA_Agreement.pdf.

Administration Agreement – agreement, dated October 20, 2008, among CPFF LLC, the FRBNY,
as managing member of the LLC, and State Street in its capacity as administrator, providing
for administration services for the CPFF. [The Custodian Agreement (page 22) and related Fee
Letter
(page
48)
are
included
here.]
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Administration_Agree
ment.pdf.
Custodian Agreement [Page 22 of the Administration Agreement] – agreement, dated October
20, 2008, between CPFF LLC and State Street, whereby State Street would provide custodian
services
to
the
CPFF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Administration_Agree
ment.pdf.
Fee Letter [Page 48 of the Administration Agreement] –letter, dated October 20, 2008,
providing a fee structure applicable to the Administration Agreement and the Custodian
Agreement.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Administration_Agree
ment.pdf.
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
Statutory Reference – Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. § 343) on which the
Fed
relied
in
authorizing
the
CPFF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRA_Section_13_Sept_19_20
08_0.pdf.
Legal Memorandum – legal memorandum, dated March 9, 2009, discussing the CPFF in light
of the requirements of FRA Section 13(3) and in particular the requirement that any such
lending be “indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank.”
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AlvarezAshtonFallonWeide
Allison2009.pdf.
Press Releases/Announcements
FR Board Announces the Creation of the CPFF to Help Restore Liquidity to the Term CP
Market (October 7, 2008) – Press release announcing the creation of the CPFF, articulating the
goals of the CPFF, and providing a link to the program’s initial terms and conditions.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Board%20announces%20cr
eation%20of%20the%20Commercial%20Paper%20Funding%20Facility%20(CPFF)%20t
o%20help%20provide%20liquidity%20to%20term%20funding%20markets.pdf.
FRBNY Announces That PIMCO Will Provide Asset Management Services in Support of the
CPFF (October 8, 2008) – FRBNY press release announcing that it would contract with PIMCO,
a large investment firm, to provide asset management services related to the CPFF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_PIMCO.pdf.
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Joint Statement by Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC (October 14, 2008) – statement regarding
actions, including the CPFF, being taken to strengthen confidence in financial institutions and
foster
functioning
of
the
credit
markets.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Joint%20Statement%20by
%20Treasury,%20Federal%20Reserve%20and%20FDIC.pdf.
FR Board Announces Additional Details Regarding the CPFF (October 14, 2008) – Press
release updating the public on the CPFF. It also provides a date for when the program would
begin
operating.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2008%2010%2014%20Boa
rd%20announces%20additional%20details%20regarding%20the%20Commercial%20Pa
per%20Funding%20Facility%20(CPFF).pdf.
FRBNY Releases Expanded CPFF FAQs (October 17, 2008) – Short FRBNY press release
announcing
that
it
had
published
an
updated
set
of
CPFF
FAQs.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_FAQ_Oct08.pdf.
FRBNY Issues Instructions and Documents for CPFF Registration (October 20, 2008) –
Archived CPFF registration instruction form developed in collaboration with PIMCO.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/RegistrationInstructions.pdf
Change to CPFF Eligibility Requirements (January 23, 2009) – FRBNY announcement of a
change to CPFF eligibility requirements to clarify that the CPFF will not purchase ABCP from
issuers
that
were
inactive
prior
to
the
adoption
of
the
CPFF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRS%20Bank%20of%20Ne
w%20York%20Press%20Release%20Change%20to%20CPFF%20Eligibility%20Requirem
ents%2001-23-2009.pdf.
FR Board Announces the Extension of Five Liquidity Facilities Including the CPFF through
October 30, 2009 (February 3, 2009) – FRB press release discussing the extension of various
crisis-era liquidity facilities that were originally set to expire on April 30, 2009.
Thhttps://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fed_announces_ext_throu
gh_Oct_30_2009_existing_liquidity_progs.pdf.
Federal Reserve System Publishes Annual Financial Statements (April, 23, 2009) – FR
Board’s 2008 combined financial statements for the combined Federal Reserve banks (which
include data regarding the CPFF), the limited liability companies created in 2008–09, and the
FR
Board.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/BOG_Annual_Financial_State
ments_Apr2309.pdf.
FR Board Announces Extensions of, and Modifications to, a Number of Its Liquidity Programs
Including the CPFF (June 25, 2009) – FRB press release announcing the extension of the CPFF,
among
other
programs,
through
early
2010.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Federal%20Reserve%20Bo
ard%20%20Federal%20Reserve%20announces%20extensions%20of%20and%20modifications
%20to%20a%20number%20of%20its%20liquidity%20programs.pdf.
The FRBNY Releases Updated CPFF FAQs (October 19, 2009) – FRBNY document that
accompanied
the
October
17,
2009
press
release
discussed
above.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Commercial%20Paper%20
Funding%20Facility%20Frequently%20Asked%20Questions.pdf.
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The FR Board Releases a Statement from its January 26–27 FOMC Meeting (January 27,
2010) – Press release from the FOMC mentioning, among other things, that the CPFF would be
closing
on
February
1,
2010.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_FOMC_Jan2710.pdf.
Media Stories
Fed’s New Tool: Business Loan Bailout (CNN Money, October 7, 2008) – News article
discussing the lead up to and initial operations plan for the CPFF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Isidore_2008_CNN_News_Fe
ds_new_tool.pdf
Treasury to Guarantee Money Market Funds (New York Times, September 19, 2008) – News
article discussing the Treasury’s backstop for money market funds. It has an aside about how
the
intervention
relates
to
the
commercial
paper
market.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Henriques_2008_Treasury_t
o_Guarantee_Money_market_funds.pdf
GE Used New Fed Commercial-Paper Funding Facility (Bloomberg.com, October 27, 2008) –
News article reporting that GE Capital, the massive financial unit of General Electric, used the
CPFF. It also includes a short summary of the CPFF and quotes from GE spokespeople.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Layne_Bloomberg_2008_GE
_Used_CPFF.pdf
Lending Grows – First Time since Lehman Collapse (CNN Money, October 30, 2008) – News
article reporting how the CPFF was responsible for the first instance of growth in the CP market
in
seven
weeks.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Goldman_2008_Lending_Gr
ows_since_lehman.pdf
Key Academic Papers
The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility (Adrian, Kimbrough, and
Marchioni 2011) – paper providing a detailed discussion of the CPFF’s design and impact.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/AdrianKimbroughMarchion
i2011_0.pdf.
The Commercial Paper Market, the Fed, and the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis (Anderson and
Gascon 2009) – paper reviewing the history of the CP market (including its structure and key
relationship to MMMFs) and presenting a detailed discussion of the market crisis and the
Federal
Reserve’s
response,
including
the
CPFF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Anderson,%20Richard%20
and%20Charles%20S%20Gascon%20The%20Commercial%20Paper%20Market%20the%
20Fed%20and%20the%202007-2009%20Financial%20Crisis%202009.pdf.
When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009
(Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010) – paper discussing the impact of various Fed programs on the
CP
market,
including
ABCP.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Kacperczyk,%20Marcin%2
0&%20Philipp%20Schnabl%20When%20Safe%20Proved%20Risky%20Commercial%20
Paper%20during%20the%20Financial%20Crisis%20of%202007%20&%202009%20201
0.pdf.
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The Real Effects of Government Liquidity Provision: Evidence from the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility (Li 2015), How Effective Was the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper
Funding Facility? Evidence from Stock Performance and Loan Provisions (March 25, 2014)
– paper examining the effects of the CPFF and concluding that participation delivered value in
two forms: (1) participants experienced improved stock performance; and (2) a positive spillover effect occurred as participants increased loans and lowered yields to their relationship
customers.
SSRN. https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Li2015_1.pdf.
Ranking of the 82 Borrowers under the Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (van Deventer 2011) – paper providing information and analysis regarding usage of
the
CPFF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/VanDeventer,%20Donald%
20Ranking%20of%20the%2082%20Borrowers%20Under%20The%20Federal%20Reser
ve%20Commercial%20Paper%20Funding%20Facility%2008-30-2011.pdf
Federal Reserve Crisis Response E: Commercial Paper Market Facilities, YPFS Case Study
2015-1E-v.1 (Wiggins and Metrick, Unpublished) – case study examining the CPFF and other
related programs adopted by the Federal Reserve during the crisis to calm the commercial
paper
markets.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Wiggins,%20Rosalind%20&
%20Andrew%20Metrick%20The%20Federal%20Reserve%20Financial%20Crisis%20Res
ponse%20E%20The%20Term%20Asset%20Backet%20Securities%20Loan%20Facility%
2002-01-2016.pdf.
Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (McNamara 2016) – YPFS case
study discussing the Treasury-FRB efforts to backstop the money market funds sector in the
midst
of
a
run.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/sites_default_files_private_C
ases_YPFS_Temporary-Guarantee-Program-for-Money-Market-Funds-13Jan16-v1.pdf.
Reports/Assessments
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of Inspector General. OIG 2010.
The Federal Reserve’s Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity:
Function, Status, and Risk Management. Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve
System,
Office
of
Inspector
General,
November
16,
2010.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRS_OIG_FRS_Lending_Facil
ities_Report_11-16-10_0.pdf.
CPFF LLC Financial Statements 2008–09 – audited financial statements of CPFF LLC for the
year ended December 31, 2009, and for the period from October 14, 2008, to December 31,
2008.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_LLC_FinStatements08-09.pdf.
CPFF LLC Financial Statements 2009–10 – audited financial statements of CPFF LLC as of May
31, 2010, and for the period from January 1, 2010, through May 31, 2010, and as of and for the
year
ended
December
31,
2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_LLC_FinStatements09-10.pdf.
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CPFF Transaction Data – Excel files of transaction data regarding the loans made by the FRBNY
to
CPFF
LLC
and
purchases
of
CP
by
CPFF
LLC.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CPFF_Transaction_Data.pdf.
Domestic Open Market Operations during 2008 – report prepared for the FR FOMC by the
Markets Group of the FRBNY discussing various lending programs including the CPFF (January
2009).
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_Domestic_Open_Ma
rket_Operations_01_2009.pdf.
Domestic Open Market Operations during 2009 – report prepared for the FR FOMC by the
Markets Group of the FRBNY discussing various lending programs including the reasons for
implementing the CPFF and its relation to other programs focused on the CP markets (January
2010). https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_OMO_09.pdf.
Domestic Open Market Operations during 2010 – report prepared for the FR FOMC by the
Markets Group of the FRBNY discussing various lending programs including the CPFF and
characteristics
and
administration
of
the
CP
held
(March
2011).
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNY_OMO_10.pdf.
FOMC Transcript (October 7, 2008) – transcript of FR FOMC conference call on October 7,
2008, approving the CPFF and discussing the reasons for its implementation and initial
reactions
to
its
announcement.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FOMCTranscriptOct72008.pdf.
FOMC Transcript (October 28–29, 2009) – transcript of the FR FOMC meeting on October 2829,
2008,
discussing
the
CPFF,
its
reception,
and
impact.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FOMC-2008b.pdf.
FRBNY Annual Reports – consolidated audited financial statements of the FRBNY for the years
2008–11
incorporating
CPFF
data.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRBNYAnnualReportsFinancialStatements.pdf.
Federal Reserve Board 95th Annual Report, 2008 – compilation of policy actions taken by the
FR Board, minutes of the FOMC meetings, and litigation occurring in 2008.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_%20AnnualReport200
8.pdf.
Federal Reserve Monthly Reports on Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet –
reports of the FR Board prepared from June 2009 to August 2012 as part of its efforts to enhance
transparency in connection with its lending and financial stability programs.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_ArchiveMonthlyReport
CreditLiquidityPrograms.pdf.
Quarterly Report on Federal Reserve Balance Sheet Developments – reports containing
similar
information
published
subsequent
to
August
2012.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_Quarterly-ReportBalance-Sheet-Developments.pdf.
Federal Reserve Statistical Release (H.15) (October 20, 2008) – reporting on the assets and
liabilities of CPFF LLC, consolidated with the assets and liabilities of the FRBNY, its sole
beneficiary. The report also notes that the Federal Reserve Board’s monthly H.4.1 statistical
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release, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement
of Federal Reserve Banks,” was modified to include information related to CPFF LLC.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_%20H.15ReleaseSelect
edInterestRatesOctober202008.pdf.
Office of Inspector General Report (November 16, 2010) – audit report by the FR’s OIG that
discusses the function and status of the various Fed lending programs, including the CPFF, and
that
identifies
the
risks
in
each
facility.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRS_OIG_FRS_Lending_Facil
ities_Report_11-16-10_0.pdf.
Testimony of Chairman Bernanke (November 18, 2008) – testimony of the Fed chairman
before the House Committee on Financial Services discussing the Fed liquidity programs
including
the
CPFF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Troubled%20Asset%20Reli
ef%20Program%20and%20the%20Federal%20Reserve's%20liquidity%20facilities.pdf.
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